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Abstract
This paper investigates recently proposed ap-
proaches for defending against adversarial exam-
ples and evaluating adversarial robustness. We
motivate adversarial risk as an objective for
achieving models robust to worst-case inputs. We
then frame commonly used attacks and evaluation
metrics as defining a tractable surrogate objective
to the true adversarial risk. This suggests that
models may optimize this surrogate rather than
the true adversarial risk. We formalize this notion
as obscurity to an adversary, and develop tools
and heuristics for identifying obscured models
and designing transparent models. We demon-
strate that this is a significant problem in practice
by repurposing gradient-free optimization tech-
niques into adversarial attacks, which we use to
decrease the accuracy of several recently proposed
defenses to near zero. Our hope is that our formu-
lations and results will help researchers to develop
more powerful defenses.
1. Introduction
Deep learning has revolutionized the field of machine learn-
ing and led to substantial improvements in many challeng-
ing problems such as image understanding (He et al., 2016),
speech recognition (Graves et al., 2013), and automatic
game playing (Mnih et al., 2015). Despite these remark-
able successes, we have seen some intriguing and troubling
properties in the behaviour of these models.
Researchers have demonstrated that certain small perturba-
tions to the input can make neural networks produce ex-
tremely bad results (Szegedy et al., 2013; Jia and Liang,
2017) For instance, in the case of image classification, im-
perceptible perturbations can lead to the resulting images
being misclassified to completely different object categories
with high confidence (Szegedy et al., 2013). These so-called
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adversarial examples can be computed relatively easily by
using optimization methods (referred to as adversarial at-
tacks) to find perturbations that maximize the loss of the net-
work (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Carlini and Wagner, 2017b).
Later work showed that this phenomena is not unique to
image classification, and appears across different model ar-
chitectures, as well as in other machine learning algorithms
(Papernot et al., 2016; 2017).
The emergence of adversarial examples and the increas-
ing deployment of machine learning models in real world
production systems has motivated extensive research on de-
veloping models that can defend against adversarial attacks
(Warde-Farley and Goodfellow, 2016; Yuan et al., 2017).
Using a variety of approaches, these works have shown that
neural models can be developed that are robust against com-
monly used attacks (Guo et al., 2017; Song et al., 2017; Xie
et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2017). However, a key question
remains unanswered: Are these models free from any adver-
sarial examples or are they simply robust to current attack
methods?
In this paper, we formalize the intuition that in settings with
the potential for catastrophic failures, minimizing expected
risk may produce models with very poor worst-case per-
formance. This motivates the study of the adversarial risk
as a measure of the model’s performance on worst-case in-
puts. However, the exact adversarial risk is computationally
intractable to evaluate, let alone optimize. We thus frame
commonly used attacks and adversarial evaluation metrics
as defining a tractable surrogate objective to the true ad-
versarial risk. We hypothesize that many defenses achieve
robustness through obscurity, i.e., the defenses work by ex-
ploiting weaknesses of certain attacks and do not eliminate
all adversarial inputs.
One of the key contributions of this paper is to experimen-
tally validate the ‘security by obscurity’ nature of recently
proposed defense methods. Specifically, we show that by
using a more powerful attack method (one better able to
maximize the true adversarial risk), we can dramatically
reduce the performance of these defenses.
To summarize, the key contributions of this paper are:
• Formulation of adversarial attacks and defenses as op-
timizing surrogates of the true adversarial risk
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• Developing the notion of obscurity to an adversary as
a tool for reasoning about when models optimize the
surrogate without optimizing the true adversarial risk
• Empirical demonstration that many defense approaches
achieve security via obscurity, and provide no benefits
in true adversarial robustness
• Use of gradient-free optimization techniques to mea-
sure when models are obscured to transfer-based and
gradient-based attacks (e.g., via gradient masking (Pa-
pernot et al., 2017)).
2. Related Work
Adversarial attacks in practice: Initial work on adversar-
ial examples focused on ‘white-box’ attacks that had access
to the model directly (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Carlini and
Wagner, 2017a). Subsequent work also demonstrated that
image classifiers can be fooled without direct access to the
model, so called ‘black-box’ or ‘oblivious’ attacks, (Paper-
not et al., 2017; 2016), even when using printed images or
3D physical objects (Kurakin et al., 2016b; Brown et al.,
2017; Athalye et al., 2018b). While adversarial examples
are the most straightforward to study in the visual domain,
they have also been demonstrated in other domains such as
reinforcement learning (Huang et al., 2017), robotics (Pinto
et al., 2017), malware detection (Grosse et al., 2016), and
natural language processing (Jia and Liang, 2017).
Progress on black-box robustness: While we argue in this
work that much of the reported progress in white-box ro-
bustness is illusory, there has been progress in defending
against black-box attacks, including Ensemble Adversar-
ial Training (Tramèr et al., 2017) and High-level Guided
Denoising (Liao et al., 2017). We point interested read-
ers to the NIPS competition on adversarial defenses for a
head-to-head comparison of defenses in the black-box threat
model, when the adversary has no access to the model and
does not know which defense is being used (Kurakin and
Goodfellow, 2017).
Evaluating adversarial robustness: Previous work has ob-
served the phenomena of gradient masking (Papernot et al.,
2017; Goodfellow and Papernot, 2017) which refers to the
fact that it is easy to intentionally or unintentionally create
models without useful gradients either by removing them,
making them too small, or adding noise. This can cause
gradient-based attacks to fail, which might lead a practi-
tioner to believe a model is robust, when in fact a more
sophisticated adversary could generate adversarial inputs
for the model. While finalizing this manuscript, Athalye
et al. (2018a) published similar conclusions and showed
that many adversarial defenses contain components which
merely mask gradients. While their attack methods differ,
their results similarly underscore the importance of attacking
proposed defenses with appropriately designed adversaries.
Certificates of adversarial robustness: Our work empha-
sizes the need for both principled methods of approaching
adversarial robustness, and stronger techniques for analyz-
ing neural networks. In this vein, we note the growing
community on verification of neural networks (Katz et al.,
2017; Bunel et al., 2017; Carlini et al., 2017), which provide
techniques to compute provably worst-case adversarial ex-
amples. Of particular interest are training procedures which
optimize certificates of robustness (Kolter and Wong, 2017;
Raghunathan et al., 2018; Sinha et al., 2017) to produce
models with provable guarantees. In general, the idea is to
design a relaxation of the original adversarial optimization
problem, which can be efficiently solved to optimality. The
role of training is then to ensure that the optimal value of
this relaxed problem is close to the optimal value of the
original problem.
Transparency: Finally, we note connections to research on
transparency in machine learning. In addition to the superfi-
cial similarities between techniques for adversarial attacks
and feature visualization (Olah et al., 2017), the shared goal
of designing models which can be efficiently analyzed sug-
gests the potential for fruitful exchange of ideas (Christiano,
2016). While in the model interpretability community, trans-
parency is often measured qualitatively from the perspective
of a human (Kim, 2015; Krakovna and Doshi-Velez, 2016;
Ross and Doshi-Velez, 2018), we note that obscurity as we
define it provides one quantitative measure of the degree to
which models can be easily analyzed by other algorithms.
3. Adversarial Risk and Obscurity
3.1. Adversarial Risk and Worst-Case Guarantees
We formalize the ideas in this paper in the context of su-
pervised learning, although they naturally extend to the
reinforcement learning setting. We seek parameters θ of a
model mθ that minimize the loss ` on inputs x and labels
y sampled from the data distribution D. Typically, the ob-
jective is to find parameters θ which minimize the expected
risk:
E
(x,y)∼D
`(mθ(x), y). (1)
In practice, this is done by optimizing the empirical risk
on a finite training set, and estimating the expected risk
with the average loss over a held-out test set. We note two
related issues. First, even models with low expected risk
may perform arbitrarily poorly on any given data point. This
may be problematic for deployment of machine learning
systems in very high-stakes situations, where even a single
catastrophic failure is not acceptable. Second, if the loss
function is unbounded, the variance of the estimator may
be arbitrarily large (Brownlees et al., 2015; Audibert et al.,
2011). In these cases, we might desire models which also
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have small worst-case risk:
sup
(x,y)∈supp(D)
`(mθ(x), y), (2)
where supp(D) denotes the support of D. The difficulty
arises from the fact that the supremum may not be easy to
compute. First, while the expectation in (1) can be estimated
by samples from the data distribution, naively computing
the supremum in (2) requires exhaustively searching the
input space, which could be exponentially expensive in the
dimension of x. Second, performing a search would require
already knowing the shape of the distribution’s support, but
the mapping from x to y is exactly what we seek to learn.
We view the local adversarial risk, denoted L, as a proxy
for the worst-case risk:
L(θ) = E
(x,y)∼D
[
sup
x′∈N(x)
`(mθ(x
′), y)
]
, (3)
where the neighborhood N(x) denotes the set of points in
supp(D) within a fixed distance  > 0 of x, as measured by
some metric. By replacing the global search for the highest
possible loss over the entire input space with a local search
over N(x), the adversarial risk formulation allows us to
use off-the-shelf optimization algorithms, such as projected
gradient descent (Madry et al., 2017; Kurakin et al., 2016a).
Further, sufficiently constraining  such that the true label y
does not change within this region allows us to search for
approximately worst-case examples, without knowing the
exact mapping from x to y.
While the local adversarial risk only provides us a certificate
for a model at a fixed set of points, as opposed to worst-case
risk which provides a certificate for a model on the whole,
it allows us to study the challenges of obtaining worst-case
guarantees in a simpler setting, and is also a necessary sub-
problem, as the adversarial risk is a lower bound on the
worst-case risk.
3.2. Obscurity with Respect to an Adversary
The true adversarial riskL is still difficult to compute exactly
due to the inner supremum. This is typically approximated
by using a particular choice of adversary f , which generates
an adversarial example in N(x) (for example, by using k
steps of projected gradient descent). We use Lˆ to denote
this surrogate adversarial risk, measured against a particular
adversary:
Lˆ(θ, f) = E
(x,y)∼D
`(mθ(f(θ, x, y)), y). (4)
We frequently refer to this as the (adversarial) evaluation
metric, measured against a particular adversary, because it
is the quantity reported in papers. However, without ad-
ditional information, good performance on the evaluation
metric need not imply high adversarial robustness. Unlike
in standard supervised learning, where the test loss gives
an unbiased estimator of the expected risk, the surrogate
adversarial risk is biased downwards from the true adversar-
ial risk. As we will show later, the gap between these two
terms can be large.
We note two potential explanations for models with high
evaluation performance: models which learn a robust de-
cision boundary, and thus admit few adversarial examples,
and models which achieve security via obscurity. That is,
while their decision boundaries admit adversarial examples,
the model makes adversarial examples difficult to identify
efficiently (Papernot et al., 2017). In the case of gradient-
based adversaries, a model may exploit gradient masking
to bypass the specific adversary, without achieving true ad-
versarial robustness (Tramèr et al., 2017; Goodfellow and
Papernot, 2017).
We refer to the difference between these terms, as the
model’s obscurity to the adversary f , i.e.,
Obscurity(θ, f) = L(θ)− Lˆ(θ, f). (5)
Intuitively, the model has high obscurity with respect to f
if the model admits many adversarial examples which f
fails to find. We will say a model is transparent if we have
a computationally efficient adversary f , against which the
model has low obscurity.
We note three reasons to actively seek transparent models
when designing adversarial defenses. First, without transpar-
ent models, we lack the tools to compute the true adversarial
risk. From a scientific perspective, this makes it difficult to
assess whether high evaluation scores reflect strong defenses
or weak attacks. Second, transparency is necessary if we
are to know in advance of deployment whether a model may
fail catastrophically or not. In some cases, it may be impor-
tant to know before deploying a machine learning model
whether that model can fail in an unlikely but catastrophic
manner. Finally, as we discuss in Section 6.4, to the extent
that adversarial training may be used to train highly robust
models (Madry et al., 2017), the ability to efficiently iden-
tify existing adversarial examples is a practical requirement.
In other words, if adversarial training works well, efficient
adversarial testing techniques become key to achieving low
adversarial risk.
4. Attack Strategies
We seek to answer the empirical question: what is the obscu-
rity of a model to adversaries commonly used in practice?
In general, computing the inner maximization in (3) is not
tractable. However, any adversary may be used to compute
lower bounds on the true adversarial risk, which also pro-
vides a lower bound on the obscurity with respect to a fixed
adversary.
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In this section, we describe both gradient-based and
gradient-free optimization strategies, which we use to
demonstrate that many seemingly robust defenses in fact
admit adversarial examples. We contrast these with transfer-
based attacks, which are frequently used for evaluation, but
are more difficult to interpret due to the subtleties in design-
ing a surrogate model similar to the original model.
4.1. Optimization-based attacks
We frame finding an (untargeted, white-box) adversarial
perturbation as a constrained optimization problem with
a margin-based loss, which is negative when an image is
misclassified (Carlini and Wagner, 2017b), and we use the
`∞ norm to determine the neighborhood around the input
point x0 with label y0:
minx mθ(x)y0 −maxj 6=y0 mθ(x)j
s.t. ‖x− x0‖∞ < ,
(6)
where mθ(x)j denotes the output logit for the class j. This
loss, which we denote Jadvθ (x), has been shown to be easier
to optimize than the cross-entropy loss because logits behave
more ‘linearly’ than the output probabilities (Carlini and
Wagner, 2017b).
Gradient-based optimization: When possible, we use pro-
jected gradient descent (PGD) to solve this optimization
problem (Kurakin et al., 2016b). In the most basic version,
we perform the following update for each iteration:
x+ = ΠN(x0)(x+ α∇xJadvθ (x)) (7)
where ΠN(x0) denotes Euclidean projection onto the set
N(x0), and where α > 0 is a step-size. In practice, we
replace the vanilla gradient update with Adam (Kingma
and Ba, 2014), which tends to converge faster for this prob-
lem. We additionally initialize x to a random perturbation
within N(x0), in case of poor local minima along the data
manifold due to gradient masking (Tramèr et al., 2017).
Gradient-free optimization: In cases where we cannot
take analytic gradients, or where they are not useful, we
can approximate them with finite difference estimates in
random directions. In this work, we use SPSA (Spall, 1992),
as described in Algorithm 1, which is well-suited for high-
dimensional optimization problems, even in the case of
noisy objectives (Spall, 1992).
Maryak and Chin (2001) show that the stochasticity intro-
duced by sampling perturbations allows SPSA to converge
to the global minimum, under appropriate conditions. While
their assumptions to not hold exactly in our setting, they
point to a qualitative difference between analytic gradients,
which provide the optimal update direction based on an in-
finitesimally small region, and gradient-free methods, which
measure changes resulting from finite perturbations.
Algorithm 1 SPSA adversarial attack
Input: function to minimize f , initial image x0 ∈ RD,
perturbation size δ, step size α > 0, batch size n
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
Sample v1, . . . , vn ∼ {1,−1}D
Define v−1i = [v
−1
i,1 , . . . , v
−1
i,D]
Calculate gi = (f(xt + δvi)− f(x− δvi))v−1i /(2δ)
Set x′t = xt − α(1/n)
∑n
i=1 gi
Project xt+1 = arg minx∈N(x0) ‖x′t − x0‖
end for
Note that we average gradient estimates to allow for an effi-
cient GPU implementation, and because we observed this to
result in faster convergence. Additionally, although previous
implementations of SPSA for neural networks tend to sam-
ple v from Gaussian distributions (Salimans et al., 2017a;
Ilyas et al., 2017) as is done in natural evolution strategies
(Wierstra et al., 2008), we sample v from a Rademacher
distribution (i.e., Bernoulli ±1), as SPSA requires v−1 to
have finite first and second moments (Spall, 1992).
In initial experiments, we also tried natural evolutionary
strategies (Wierstra et al., 2008; Ilyas et al., 2017) and zero-
order optimization (Chen et al., 2017), two other gradient-
free optimization techniques. Comparisons are included in
Appendix A. We found SPSA to reliably produce adversarial
examples, but we believe the specific choice of gradient-free
optimizer is relatively unimportant. In particular, any adver-
sary provides a valid lower bound on the true adversarial
risk.
4.2. Transfer-based attacks
In cases where the adversary lacks direct access to the model
being attacked, a useful attack strategy is to transfer adver-
sarial examples from a known model m′ to the unknown
model m. This approach has been effective against unde-
fended classifiers both when the surrogate model is trained
to mimic the unknown model (Papernot et al., 2017) and
when the surrogate is a generic image classifier (Szegedy
et al., 2013). However, while transfer-based methods pro-
vide a practical attack vector, robustness to any given
transfer-based attack may not imply robustness in general,
since the success of the attack is highly dependent on the
similarity between m′ and m.
One particularly relevant case is defenses which apply a
(possibly non-differentiable) transformation t before clas-
sifying the image. A common evaluation strategy is then
to transfer adversarial examples from the original model
m to the defended model m ◦ t. In this case, the defended
model may admit adversarial examples, but appear to be
adversarially robust, provided its weaknesses are sufficiently
different from those of the original model m.
Adversarial Risk and the Dangers of Evaluating Against Weak Attacks
Dataset Defense strategy OriginalEvaluation
Adversarial
Accuracy Bound
Obscurity
Bound
CIFAR-10
( = 8)
PixelDefend (Song et al., 2017) 75% <10% >65%
Adversarial Training (Madry et al., 2017) 47% <47% >0%
ImageNet
( = 2)
Non-differentiability (Guo et al., 2017) 15% 0% 15%
Stochasticity (Xie et al., 2017) 36% <1% >35%
High-level Guided Denoiser (Liao et al., 2017) 75% 0% 75%
Table 1: Summary of results. We find that while most proposed defenses confer significant robustness to the adversaries
they are evaluated against in the original papers, they remain highly vulnerable to adversarial examples. Perturbation sizes 
are relative to images with pixel intensities in [0, 255]. Note that our numbers in the left column differ slightly from those in
the original papers due to standardizing evaluation conditions across defenses. We explain the sources of these differences,
compared to the pure replication, in the corresponding subsections.
5. Reasoning about Obscurity
A key point is that while neither obscurity nor adversar-
ial risk are directly computable, we can reason a priori
about obscurity much more easily than adversarial risk for
new models. From the viewpoint of obscurity, the relevant
question is not “does the model admit any adversarial in-
puts?” but rather: “if the model were to admit adversarial
inputs, would the adversarial evaluation detect these in-
puts?” Thus, while the adversarial robustness of a particular
defense ultimately relies on empirical evaluation, obscurity
can guide algorithm design towards approaches which will
not be obscured to adversaries, which confers significant
advantages as discussed above in Section 3.2. We briefly
outline several heuristics here, which are further developed
in context throughout the experimental section:
Will the surrogate objective converge to the true adversarial
objective? Many evaluations with transfer-based adversaries
fail this test, since even in the limit, an adversarial example
for the surrogate classifier m′ might not fool the original
classifier m, unless m′ and m are guaranteed to be similar.
Of course, in some cases adversarial examples may transfer,
as in Papernot et al. (2017; 2016), and indeed if the surrogate
is optimized to match the original model, such attacks can
be highly effective. But on its own, merely sharing some
parameters does not guarantee adversarial examples will
transfer from the surrogate to the defense model. In Section
6.2.3, we provide an example of a model which suffers
almost no change in accuracy against a transfer-based attack,
despite having 0% true adversarial accuracy.
Is the true objective well-behaved? (Goodfellow et al., 2014)
argue that gradient-based search techniques for adversarial
examples work for largely the same reasons that gradient-
based optimization works for training deep networks. From
the view of obscurity and robustness to worst-case adver-
saries, this is an advantage, not a disadvantage. This means
that standard issues arising in neural network training, such
as vanishing gradients (Sec. 6.2.2) and discrete or highly
nonlinear operations (Sec. 6.1), also present difficulties for
gradient-based adversaries.
Conclusively demonstrating that a defense has high obscu-
rity ultimately does require evaluating against a stronger
adversary, as we do experimentally. However, heuristic
reasoning can often approximately predict obscurity of a
model, thus allowing focus on approaches with low obscu-
rity. We validate these heuristics experimentally by studying
several defenses we hypothesized to have high obscurity to
their evaluation adversary, and one we did not. We show
that in all defenses hypothesized to have high obscurity, the
evaluation metric does not capture the true adversarial risk.
In these cases, we show that the true adversarial accuracy is
near zero in spite of high surrogate adversarial accuracy.
6. Experiments
In this section we empirically study several broad categories
of proposed defense strategies on the CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky
and Hinton, 2009) and ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) datasets.
To follow standard practice, we assume the 0−1 loss and
report accuracy, i.e. 1− Lˆ(θ, f). 1 We selected examples to
illustrate pros and cons of each approach and we attempted
to use the strongest possible defense within each category
where possible (for example, the two highest-scoring sub-
missions to the NIPS Adversarial Defenses Competition).
We note that many published works combine elements of
multiple strategies, such as adding defensive components
ex post to an adversarially trained network. However, we
analyze defense strategies separately, both to isolate the
effect of the core idea, and because combining defenses
does not affect our underlying claim: that obscured defenses
create a gap between the evaluation metric and the true
adversarial risk.
1However, as previously noted, adversarial robustness is most
salient in settings with heavy-tailed losses, where the task requires
models which avoid catastrophic failures.
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6.1. Non-differentiability
Original evaluation: Guo et al. (2017) argue that non-
differentiability combined with stochasticity can provide
a useful defense against adversarial examples. They pro-
pose several variations on the core idea of applying an image
transformation to remove adversarial artifacts before classi-
fying the image with a pretrained classifier. Although JPEG
encoding is among the weaker proposed defenses we in-
clude it here as a particularly clear example of how common
adversaries may fail to measure the true adversarial risk,
and note that similar arguments apply to the other proposed
defenses.
Guo et al. (2017) evaluate their defenses against a variety of
transfer-based attacks, by optimizing an adversarial image
to fool the original undefended model, and then classifying
these images with the defended model. We verify that JPEG
compression, with JPEG quality 75, provides some defense
against transfer-based attacks (referred to as “gray-box”),
by using PGD to generate high-confidence adversarial ex-
amples, against which the defense achieves 15% accuracy
on ImageNet at  = 2, compared to 0% for the undefended
model.
Demonstration of obscurity: We argue that this defense is
obscured to both gradient-based and transfer-based adver-
saries, and that neither attack should be expected to iden-
tify near worst-case adversarial attacks, even against a non-
adversarially robust model.
First, standard gradient-based optimizers cannot be used
when the model is non-differentiable. However, as previ-
ously noted (Goodfellow and Papernot, 2017), any model
can trivially be made non-differentiable without removing
adversarial examples, for example by decreasing the soft-
max entropy or converting the softmax to a hard maximum.
Second, as discussed in Section 5, merely sharing parame-
ters used in the original model (gray-box attack) is insuffi-
cient to guarantee adversarial examples will transfer from
the surrogate to the original model, if the surrogate model
uses different preprocessing.
To verify these arguments, we attack the defended model,
m◦t where t represents JPEG compression, using the SPSA
adversary. By using a gradient-free method, we are able
to attack the end-to-end model, despite the lack of an ana-
lytic gradient. Using this attack, we reduce the adversarial
accuracy of the model to 0% on ImageNet with  = 2.
6.2. Leveraging generative models
6.2.1. DETECTING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Original evaluation: Song et al. (2017) argue that “adver-
sarial examples mainly lie in the low probability regions
of the training distribution, regardless of attack types and
targeted models.” They use a PixelCNN as a density model
(van den Oord et al., 2016) to flag inputs with likelihood
below some threshold as potentially adversarial. While this
is not a method to classify adversarial examples per se, we
include it as an illustrative example, since many similar
proposals to leverage generative models for adversarial ex-
amples appeal to an intuition that density models should
flag adversarial examples far from the natural data manifold
(Meng and Chen, 2017).
For our experiments, we use a pretrained PixelCNN model,
which assigns a likelihood of 3.02 bits/dim on the CIFAR-10
test set. We verify their result that adversarial examples gen-
erated by an adversary oblivious to the detection model can
be detected with likelihood thresholding. Figure 1 shows
that adversarial examples generated with PGD on CIFAR-
10 at  = 8 receive significantly lower likelihoods from
the PixelCNN, compared to natural images. Specifically,
thresholding at 4.68 bits/dim achieves a 1% false postive
rate while detecting 99.7% of adversarial examples.
Demonstration of obscurity: If the adversary is aware of
the defense, we can construct non-detectable adversarial
examples by simultaneously optimizing for both misclassi-
fication and likelihood under the density model. Formally,
letting Jadvθ (x) denote the objective in the original adversar-
ial optimization in Eq. 6, and lCNN(x) denote the negative
log-likelihood of x according to the PixelCNN model, we
modify the objective in Eq. 6 with Jadvθ (x) + λlCNN(x),
and optimize with PGD as usual. This allows us to find
adversarial examples which receive higher likelihood than
their natural counterparts, as summarized in Figure 1. Using
the same threshold, to achieve a 1% false positive rate, the
detector now detects 0% of the adversarial examples.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Bits per dimension (CIFAR-10)
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Figure 1: Detecting adversarial examples with a genera-
tive model: While typical adversarial examples lie in low
probability regions of the input space, an adversary with
access to the density model can construct non-detectable
adversarial examples, which are both misclassified and as-
signed higher likelihood than than their natural counterparts.
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6.2.2. PURIFICATION VIA LIKELIHOOD OPTIMIZATION
Original evaluation: The main defense proposed in Song
et al. (2017) is the PixelDefend procedure, which uses a Pix-
elCNN to purify images towards the distribution observed
in training. Concretely, the PixelDefend algorithm involves
maximizing the likelihood lCNN, subject to a neighborhood
constraint, similar to eq. 6, but using a different objective.
The constraint can be modified to balance clean accuracy
with adversarial accuracy; we use defend = 16, which
achieved best results in the original paper.
Song et al. (2017) reported that optimizing likelihood with
gradient descent resulted in lower rather than higher likeli-
hoods, and instead opted for an iterative greedy algorithm,
which iterates over the pixels and sets each to the value
within the feasible set which maximizes the likelihood of
the new image. However, we found that when using a con-
tinuous, rather than discrete, parameterization over pixel
likelihoods, gradient descent was able to optimize the likeli-
hood. 2 We used the gradient-based version of PixelDefend
since it avoids the need to evaluate the PixelCNN model
once per pixel.
Song et al. (2017) consider two types of attacks: a gradient-
based attack against the end-to-end model, and a transfer-
based attack, using the undefended network as the surrogate
model. We verify that PixelDefend is able to successfully
defend against the strongest attack, transfer-based FGSM,
achieving 75% accuracy at  = 8.
Demonstration of obscurity: As stated in Song et al.
(2017), an end-to-end gradient-based attack against the Pix-
elDefend model is impractical, due to vanishing gradients
when backpropagating through the unrolling of the optimiza-
tion process. We avoid this issue by using SPSA and directly
attacking the end-to-end model, which reduces the accuracy
of PixelDefend to 10% on CIFAR-10 at  = 8. While we
acknowledge that exact values may differ due to differences
in implementation, we believe these numbers neverthelesss
reflect the fact that the lengthy optimization process ob-
scures the model to the gradient-based and transfer-based
adversaries in the original paper.
We note that finding adversarial examples for the PixelDe-
fend with SPSA is computationally expensive, due to both
the optimization step in the PixelDefend inference proce-
dure, and the sample inefficiency of gradient free optimiza-
tion. In this sense, the computational cost of the PixelDefend
model provides a form of obscurity, as it raises the concern
that additional adversarial examples could be found simply
by running a more expensive optimization.
2Precisely, the likelihood over pixels is parameterized as a
mixture of logistics as in PixelCNN++ (Salimans et al., 2017b),
rather than a 256-way softmax.
6.2.3. PURIFICATION WITH AUTOENCODERS
Original evaluation: Another approach to bringing adver-
sarial examples closer to the data manifold is to train a
neural autoencoder to predict purified images from adversar-
ial images. In Liao et al. (2017), the autoencoder can either
be trained to produce images which are similar in pixel
space, by using the distance between the clean image and
purified adversarial image as the loss, or in feature space, by
using the distance between the classifier’s logits on the clean
and purified images as the loss. Using the latter approach,
which they name the high-level guided denoiser, they won
the NIPS Adversarial Examples competition, demonstrating
strong performance against over 100 oblivious black-box
adversaries (Kurakin and Goodfellow, 2017).
In Liao et al. (2017), the ‘white-box’ evaluation is a transfer-
based attack, using the undefended model as a surrogate. In
our replication, the defended model achieves 75% accuracy
on ImageNet at  = 2.
Demonstration of obscurity: Since the autoencoder t(x)
is a fully differentiable function from images to images, we
can simply view the end-to-end modelm ◦ t as a single neu-
ral network, and attack the entire model with PGD. Using
this strategy, we decrease the model’s accuracy to 0% on Im-
ageNet at  = 2. We note that our results echo those in Gu
and Rigazio (2014), which observed on MNIST that while
preprocessing images with an autoencoder provided defense
against an oblivious adversary, the end-to-end model was
actually more vulnerable to adversarial examples from a
white-box adversary.
This example supports the point in Section 5 that, unless
the surrogate model in transfer-based attacks is somehow
optimized to produce examples transferable to the original
model, we should not expect the attack to necessarily suc-
ceed even against non-adversarially robust defenses. In this
case, the model suffers almost no performance drop from a
transfer-based attack, despite having 0% accuracy against
an white-box optimization-based adversary.
6.3. Stochasticity and Ensembling
Original evaluation: Xie et al. (2017) propose using ran-
domized models, so that an adversary is unable to know
which model to optimize against. Rather than training an
entire ensemble of models from scratch, they propose to aug-
ment a single model with random amounts of padding and
resizing, based on the observation that small resizing opera-
tions can remove many adversarial effects. Combined with
Ensemble Adversarial Training (Tramèr et al., 2017), this
model ranked second in the NIPS Adversarial Defenses com-
petition, demonstrating strong performance against oblivi-
ous black-box adversaries.
The strongest adversary used for evaluation is the authors’
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proposed ‘ensemble-pattern attack.’ For this attack, they
construct a deterministic surrogate model, by selecting k =
21 sub-models, each consisting of a fixed padding-resize
template which is applied before classifying the image, and
averaging the predictions of the sub-models. We verified
that the stochastic model has moderate robustness against
this attack, with 36% accuracy on ImageNet at  = 2. 3
Demonstration of obscurity: As before, we note even a
non-adversarially robust model may demonstrate anything
between zero and clean accuracy against transfer-based at-
tacks, depending on the similarity of the surrogate model.
While the authors partially address this by using an ensem-
ble as the surrogate, which improves transferability, it is still
possible that the obtained adversarial example could overfit
to the specific sub-models.
To attack the model, we perform stochastic gradient de-
scent directly on the expectation of the objective. Formally,
we replace the original objective Jadvθ (x) in Eq. 6 with
E[Jadvθ (x)], where the expectation is over randomness inter-
nal to the model. Using stochastic gradient descent we can
maximize this term, the expected margin of misclassifica-
tion, by sampling from the distribution of random paddings
and resizings, and performing a gradient step evaluated for
that specific sub-model (Athalye et al., 2018b). Using this
attack, we decrease the accuracy of the stochastic model to
1% on ImageNet at  = 2.
6.4. Adversarial training
Original defense: In adversarial training (Goodfellow et al.,
2014), the network is trained to minimize the adversarial
risk by performing stochastic gradient descent at the (ap-
proximately) maximally adversarial perturbations of the
training data. This is done by generating adversarial exam-
ples at each training iteration, and training on the adversarial
examples, rather than the natural data. Following Madry
et al. (2017) our adversarially trained network achieves 47%
accuracy on CIFAR-10 against a gradient-based adversary
with  = 8.
Discussion of obscurity: Unlike the previously discussed
defenses, we did not (a priori) suspect adversarially trained
networks to be obscured to the evaluation adversary. How-
ever, we wanted to investigate further: while adversarial
training does not explicitly introduce any non-differentiable
components, the network could still learn to mask gradi-
ents through the training procedure. For example, Tramèr
et al. (2017) demonstrate that adversarial training with a
single-step adversary results in gradient masking, unless the
adversary initializes to random perturbations.
3Our numbers differ from the numbers reported for white-box
accuracy in the original paper because they evaluate against a sub-
set of the test set which every member of a fixed ensemble classifies
correctly, whereas we simply pick 1000 images at random.
We use gradient-free optimization as a tool to check whether
a more subtle version of this phenomena occurs even when
training with stronger adversaries – intuitively, if the loss
surface is highly nonconvex, finite perturbations may be
more informative than infinitesimal ones. However, we
found that the model achieved 51% accuracy against SPSA
at  = 8, and only in 0.2% of images did SPSA succeed
when PGD did not. Although far from conclusive, this adds
to the picture of PGD as a near-optimal adversary for differ-
entiable image classifiers: alongside evidence that random
restarts of PGD converge to similar loss values (Madry et al.,
2017) and that PGD is a near-optimal adversary in small
neural networks (Carlini et al., 2017). In Appendix C, we
provide additional experiments supporting this view.
As one of the few techniques which currently appear to
improve the true adversarial risk, adversarial training un-
derscores the importance of transparent models with low
obscurity to an efficient adversary. For example, current
versions of adversarial training would not be viable with
non-differentiable models, because gradient-free optimizers,
such as SPSA, are orders of magnitude less efficient than
their gradient-based counterparts.
7. Conclusion
We believe that as machine learning continues to be de-
ployed in increasingly high-stakes applications, assessing
and improving the worst-case behavior of models will be-
come increasingly important. While the ultimate goal is
models with low worst-case risk (as well as low expected
risk), we view adversarial risk as a simpler proxy objective
which allows us to study similar challenges of obtaining
worst-case guarantees in machine learning models.
We thus frame common evaluation procedures as defining
a tractable surrogate to the true adversarial risk. In this
view, the evaluation metric with any fixed adversary is only
relevant to the extent that we would expect the adversary to
find adversarial examples if they exist.
We believe that the framework of obscurity to adversaries
offers a useful, if rough, sieve for designing adversarial de-
fenses, and develop several heuristics for designing transpar-
ent defenses. In our experimental validation, we confirmed
that in cases where we suspected obscurity to the evaluation
adversary, we were able to devise attacks which resulted in
dramatically lower adversarial accuracy.
Recent work has seen significant progress in robustness
to oblivious adversaries (Liao et al., 2017; Tramèr et al.,
2017; Xie et al., 2017), largely driven by standardized black-
box evaluation procedures (Kurakin and Goodfellow, 2017).
Similarly, we hope that rigorous evaluation against strong
adversaries and better understanding of obscurity will drive
progress towards models free of adversarial examples.
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A. Comparison of Gradient-free Attacks
In our initial experiments, we evaluated several different
gradient-free attacks, including SPSA, natural evolutionary
strategies (NES) (Wierstra et al., 2008; Ilyas et al., 2017),
and zero-order optimization (ZOO) (Chen et al., 2017). For
ZOO, we used ZOO-ADAM, which uses coordinate descent
with coordinate-wise Adam updates (Kingma and Ba, 2014),
without the importance sampling or feature reduction tricks
used on ImageNet.
All our initial experiments on ImageNet were run against
a ResNet-50 model, which achieves 75% accuracy, with
100 randomly selected test images. All experiments on
CIFAR-10 used a VGG-like fully convolutional model,
which achieves 94.5% accuracy, with 1000 randomly se-
lected test images.
Overall attack success rate: On CIFAR-10, all attacks
drive accuracy to 0%, using less than 32768 model evalu-
ations, and often much fewer, e.g. SPSA decreases accu-
racy to less than 5% after 2048 model evaluations. Attacks
on ImageNet tended to require substantially more model
evaluations to drive accuracy to 0%, likely due to the high
dimensionality of the input images. Results on ImageNet
are summarized below in Table 2.
Batch size SPSA NES ZOO
256 29% 30% 72%
512 21% 22% 69%
2048 2% 2% 43%
8192 0% 0% 10%
Table 2: Attack success rate with increasing computa-
tion We show the accuracy of ResNet-50 against each ad-
versary, with varying amounts of computation. Each attack
is run for a maximum of 300 iterations, but with varying
batch sizes. In other words, we vary the number of finite
difference estimates used before applying each gradient es-
timate. With sufficient computation, both NES and SPSA
decrease accuracy to 0% on ImageNet with  = 2.
Convergence speed: Figure 2 provides a different view on
the same data and shows the amount of computation before
the adversary finds a misclassified image.
For our main experiments, we use a fixed large batch size
because our aim is to produce models robust to the strongest
possible attacks. In particular, the hyperparameters are
selected to reliably generate adversarial examples, rather
than to be query-efficient, but in situations where query
efficiency is a factor, the same algorithms can be tuned by,
for example, reducing the batch size.
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Figure 2: Model evaluations before finding misclassified
adversarial example: Although attacks with larger batch
sizes require longer before beginning to identify adversarial
examples, over time, they more reliably identify adversarial
examples. For fair comparison, attacks with smaller batch
sizes uses more iterations so that the number of model eval-
uations is constant across attacks. We use a log scale axis
since most attacks succeed significantly sooner than the
maximum number of iterations.
B. Hyperparameters
We evaluated all attacks and defenses on 1000 images ran-
domly sampled from either the CIFAR-10 or the ImageNet
test set, with the exception of PixelDefend which we could
only evaluate on 100 images due to a limited computational
budget. We ran attacks for a maximum of 100 iterations,
and stopped when the margin-based objective in Eq. (6)
was less than −5.0. In many cases, the attack completes
fairly quickly, in fewer than ten iterations. For all of our
optimization-based attacks, we use random initializations
by sampling a perturbation from the `∞ ball and projecting
back onto the interval [0, 255] (to ensure the resulting image
is valid). Hyperparameters are provided below. We have
additionally made our implementation avaliable through the
open-source library cleverhans (Papernot et al., 2018).
Perturbation size δ 0.01
Adam learning rate 0.01
Maximum iterations 100
Batch size 8192
Table 3: Hyperparameters for SPSA attack
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C. Discussion of Adversarial Training
As discussed in the paper, gradient-free adversaries allow
us to investigate the degree of gradient masking in adversar-
ially trained networks. Gradients estimated based on finite
perturbations, rather than infinitesimal ones, may result in
qualitatively different behavior (for example, in the case
of high-frequency oscillations in the loss surface). Thus,
SPSA may, in some cases, converge to better minima than
techniques which purely use analytic gradients.
Section 6.4 verified that the expected surrogate adversarial
risk (averaged over the test set) cannot be decreased with
SPSA. We also investigated whether SPSA could identify
better minima than projected gradient descent (PGD) for
certain data points. We found that SPSA and PGD found
similarly adversarial perturbations for almost all images,
which provides further evidence that, in adversarially trained
networks, perturbations found by PGD may be nearly worst-
case possible perturbations, in which case the surrogate
adversarial risk measured against a PGD adversary will be
close to the true adversarial risk. These results are summa-
rized in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Analysis of gradient-free masking in adversar-
ially trained networks: We compare the final values of the
margin-based objective across different images, after using
projected gradient descent or SPSA. Each point represents
a single image, and is misclassified when Jadvθ (x) < 0.
Points close to the line y = x indicate that SPSA and PGD
identified similarly adversarial perturbations. Points below
the line, shown in red, indicate those for which SPSA iden-
tified stronger adversarial perturbation than PGD. Overall,
SPSA and PGD identify comparably adversarial perturba-
tions, and there are few points where SPSA identifies signif-
icantly stronger adversarial perturbations than PGD.
D. Additional Experiments
In Figure 4, we include complete experimental results evalu-
ating each of the (non-adversarial training) defenses across
a range of perturbation sizes for a number of different attack
methods. Although all models shows significant robustness
against the original evaluation adversaries, the accuracy of
all models falls to near zero when evaluated against stronger
attacks.
Adversarial Risk and the Dangers of Evaluating Against Weak Attacks
SPSA FGSM-Transfer PGD-Transfer
0 5 10 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1

M
od
el
ac
cu
ra
cy
(a) JPEG compression (ImageNet)
0 5 10 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1

(b) PixelDefend (CIFAR-10)
0 5 10 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1

(c) High-level Guided Denoising (ImageNet)
0 5 10 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1

(d) Stochasticity (ImageNet)
Figure 4: Models can be obscured to gradient-based and transfer-based attacks by adding effectively non-differentiable
operations and using purification to change the model’s decision boundaries compared to the original model. However, this
does not remove all adversarial examples – using stronger attacks, we can reduce the accuracy of all defenses to near zero.
